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PUBLIC LAW SOURCES AND 
ANALOGIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Eirik Bjorge* 
Are the "general principles of law recognised by civilized nations" capable of adjusting to the 
progress and needs of the international community? This article argues that they are, and that 
international law needs, to a larger degree than what has been the case, to draw on principles of 
public law. Those principles of public law are not to supplant, but to supplement, those of private law. 
The article analyses four principles: the principle of legality; the principle requiring positive legal 
basis for state action; the principle that even the highest emanation of the executive power cannot 
escape judicial review; and the principle of protection of legitimate expectations. If one takes account 
of the needs of international law, there is no reason whatever why today we should accede to the 
orthodoxy that the intention behind the concept of general principles is only to authorise a court to 
apply the general principles of municipal jurisprudence, in particular of private law, in so far as they 
are applicable to relations of states – if for no other reason than the fact that international law no 
longer governs only relations of states.  
I INTRODUCTION 
The focus of this article is the extent to which "general principles of law recognised by civilized 
nations"1 are capable of adjusting to the progress and needs of the international community. The 
  
*  Professor of Law, University of Bristol. 
1  Statute of the International Court of Justice 892 UNTS 119 (26 June 1945), art 38(1)(c). See for example 
Hersch Lauterpacht Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law (Longmans, New York, 1927); 
Jean Spiropoulos Die allgemeinen Rechtsgrundsätze im Völkerrecht (Verlag des Institut für Internationales 
Recht an der Universität Kiel, Kiel, 1928); Bin Cheng General Principles of Law as Applied by International 
Courts and Tribunals (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1953); AP Sereni Principî generali di diritto 
e processo internazionale (Giuffrè, Milan, 1955); Alfred Verdross "Les principes généraux de droit dans le 
système des sources du droit international public" in Recueil d'études de droit international en hommage à 
Paul Guggenheim (Faculté de droit de l'Université de Genève, Geneva, 1968) 521; Alain Pellet Recherche 
sur les principes généraux de droit en droit international (Université de Paris, Paris, 1974); Hermann Mosler 
"Rechtsvergleichung vor völkerrechtlichen Gerichten" in René Marcic (ed) Internationale Festschrift für 
Alfred Verdross zum 80 Geburtstag (Wilhelm Fink Verlag, München, 1971) 381; Hermann Mosler "To what 
extent does the variety of legal systems of the world influence the application of the general principles of law 
within the meaning of Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice?" in International 
Law and the Grotian Heritage (TMC Asser Instituut, The Hague, 1985) 173; Prosper Weil Écrits de droit 
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argument made here is that they are. General principles should draw on principles developed in public 
law systems in domestic law. The conclusion is that international law needs to a larger degree than 
what has been the case to draw on principles of public law. Those principles of public law are not to 
supplant, but to supplement, those of private law. Four principles are subjected to analysis: first, the 
principle of legality; second, the principle requiring positive legal basis for state action; third, the 
principle that even the highest emanation of the executive power cannot escape judicial review; and, 
fourth, the principle of protection of legitimate expectations.  
When the Committee of Jurists addressed in 1920 the question of which law the Permanent Court 
of International Justice was to administer, it took the view that one of the sources of law was general 
principles of law.2 It was not an obvious choice. By according such weight to internal law, the 
Committee went far in giving prominence to the domestic legal experience.3 It was, according to the 
account of Lord Phillimore, the British member of the Committee, the Continental members who 
insisted that general principles to be included.4 These members had feared that, if general principles 
were not included as a source, injustice might be done: "And then to meet the fears of our foreign 
friends, we added—3. 'The general principles of law recognised by civilised nations'."5 
It seems that what the delegates had in mind were, in the first instance, procedural principles.6 In 
the debates, Lord Phillimore made explicit reference to "certain principles of procedure, the principle 
  
international (University Press of France, Paris, 2000) at 379–402; Robert Kolb "General Principles of 
Procedural Law" in Andreas Zimmermann, Christian Tomuschat and Karin Oellers-Frahm (eds) The Statute 
of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) 871; 
Alain Pellet "Article 38" in Andreas Zimmermann, Christian Tomuschat and Karin Oellers-Frahm (eds) The 
Statute of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) 
731; and Catherine Redgwell "General Principles of International Law" in Stefan Vogenauer and Stephen 
Weatherill (eds) General Principles of Law: European and Comparative Perspectives (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2017) 5. The International Law Commission has included in its programme of work the topic "general 
principles of law", on the basis of the preliminary report of Marcelo Vázquez-Bermúdez (International Law 
Commission Report on the work of the sixty-ninth session UN Doc A/72/10 (2017) at Annex A), which 
includes a valuable outline of the debates and a bibliography. 
2  Procès-Verbaux of the Proceedings of the Committee (Van Langenhuysen, The Hague, 1920) at 310 and 
following. 
3  Rolando Quadri "Le système des règles internationales" (1964) 113 Hague Recueil 319 at 351. 
4  Lord Phillimore Scheme for the Permanent Court International Justice (1920) 6 GST 89 at 94. 
5  At 94. 
6  See generally Sereni, above n 1; Robert Kolb "General Principles of Procedural Law" in Andreas 
Zimmermann, Christian Tomuschat and Karin Oellers-Frahm (eds) The Statute of the International Court of 
Justice: A Commentary (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) 871; Robert Kolb The International 
Court of Justice (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2013) at 917–952; and Carlo Santulli Droit du contentieux 
international (2nd ed, Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, Paris, 2015) at 66–70. 
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of good faith, and the principle of res judicata".7 The one arbitral authority cited in the deliberations 
was Pious Funds, on the procedural principle of res judicata.8 This focus on procedure persisted after 
the adoption of Article 38.9 Still today the most successful use of domestic law analogies before the 
International Court has been within the field of procedure.10 Three reasons stand out in this regard. 
First, procedural law is probably the field in which judicially discovered principles are the least 
threatening to the freedom of action of states:11 substantive principles, on the other hand, might be 
thought to pose more of a threat.  
Second, the overlap between general principles of a procedural nature on the one hand and the 
inherent powers or jurisdiction of international courts and tribunals on the other could be thought to 
be another reason why general principles of a procedural nature are more palatable.12  
Third, and logically connected with the two first, the decisive consideration for the Committee of 
Jurists was the desire to avoid a non liquet,13 the fear being (latent in the quotation by Lord Phillimore 
given above) that a declaration of non liquet might lead to denial of justice.14 To a large extent this 
explains the need for general principles such as "certain principles of procedure, the principle of good 
faith, and the principle of res judicata".15 But in addition to enabling the Court to perform its judicial 
function when no specific rules deriving from treaty or customary international law exist, the 
reference to general principles of law would also operate such that the Court:16 
  
7  Procès-Verbaux, above n 2, at 335 (per Lord Phillimore). 
8  Pious Funds (United States v Mexico) (1902) 9 RIAA 11; and Procès-Verbaux, above n 2, at 310 (per Baron 
Descamps) and 316 (per Lord Phillimore). 
9  Arnold Ræstad "'Droit coutumier' et 'principes généraux' en droit international" (1933) 4 NJIL 61 at 74. 
10  James Crawford Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law (8th ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2012) at 36–37. 
11  Dionisio Anzilotti Cours de droit international (Gilbert Gidel (translator), Sirey, 1929) at 118. 
12  See generally Robert Kolb The International Court of Justice (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2012) at 77–108; 
Chester Brown A Common Law of Adjudication (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007) at 35–82; Northern 
Cameroons (Cameroon v United Kingdom) [1963] ICJ Rep 15 at 29; and Nuclear Tests (Australia v France) 
[1974] ICJ Rep 253 at 259. 
13  Alain Pellet, above n 1, at 832; Philippe Couvreur The International Court of Justice and the Effectiveness of 
International Law (Brill, Leiden, 2016) at 29; and Catherine Redgwell, above n 1, at 7. See Procès-Verbaux, 
above n 2, at 318 (per Baron Descamps), 311 (per Loder), 312–313 (per de Lapradelle) and 307 (per Hagerup). 
14  Procès-Verbaux, above n 2, at 312 (per de Lapradelle) and 317 (per Hagerup). 
15  At 335 (per Lord Phillimore). 
16  Couvreur, above n 13, at 30. See also Procès-Verbaux, above n 2, at 311 and 318–319 (per Baron Descamps). 
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… would not render justice at the expense of the legal security and predictability which a court owes to 
litigants, and that it would still apply international law by having recourse to the said general principles 
…  
Wishing by the late 1920s to develop substantive principles, Lauterpacht turned in his eponymous 
study of private law sources and analogies of international law to domestic private law.17 Borrowing 
from domestic private law concepts made eminent sense, the contractual relationships of individuals 
being applied to states in their equally synallagmatic relationships. Furthermore, it has been argued 
that there was at the time no such thing as public law in the country in which Lauterpacht had made 
his home.18 There is still much to be said for Lauterpacht's approach, but it needs today to be 
completed by reversion also to public law principles. International decision-making needs to be 
mirrored by constitutional and administrative law safeguards. To the extent that international law has 
not been able to proffer them itself, such principles are beginning to be, and should be, sought also in 
public law rules developed and applied in foro domestico. To take one example: if, as has been 
suggested, today "[t]he protection of legitimate expectations within carefully defined limits is a 
general principle of law, anchored in the world's major legal systems",19 then, as will be seen below, 
that mooring is in municipal public law, not procedural or private. Against that background, 
international law is today far from being only "private law writ large".20 The grammar of private law 
still has much to offer international law, but the future maturation and sophistication of international 
law depend also on the development of general principles of law taken from public law.  
It is important to remember, however, that the principles of domestic law cannot be recruited 
"'lock, stock and barrel', ready-made and fully equipped with a set of rules".21 As will be seen, it is 
important in this regard to take into account the differences in the grammar of internal public law and 
public international law. 
There are already those who argue that public law sources and analogies must be allowed to play 
a greater role in international law. But, whilst the existing literature does interrogate the extent to 
  
17  Lauterpacht, above n 1. 
18  Prosper Weil "Droit international public et droit administratif" in Mélanges Trotabas (Librairie générale de 
droit et de jurisprudence, Paris, 1970) 511 at 513–514. This is wrong as a matter of the law that was actually 
in existence, and had been for a long time (see Paul Craig UK, EU and Global Administrative Law: 
Foundations and Challenges (The Hamlyn Lectures) (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015) at ch 
1) – but it may nevertheless be a valid explanation. 
19  Campbell McLachlan, Laurence Shore and Matthew Weiniger International Investment Arbitration (2nd ed, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017) at 315. 
20  Thomas Holland Studies in International Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1898) at 152; and Lauterpacht, above 
n 1, at 81. 
21  International Status of South West Africa (Advisory Opinion) [1950] ICJ Rep 128 at 148 (separate opinion of 
Judge McNair). 
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which public law analogies can be relied on in certain sub-fields of international law, such as 
international investment law and global administrative law, it largely ignores whether the mainstay of 
general international law can draw on domestic public law.22  
II HOW PRINCIPLES DEVELOPED IN FORO DOMESTICO 
ARE ELEVATED TO THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 
General principles of law are to be understood as first principles, "propositions premières" as 
Basdevant called them, common to municipal legal systems and capable of being transported onto the 
international legal order.23 In order for a rule to be characterised as a general principle of law, it needs 
to go through a two-stage process, the first stage of which is abstraction; the second, generalisation. 
This process strips the domestic rule of its detailed municipal particularities and brings out its general 
and universal features.24 What is important in that regard are not the superficial similarities of rules 
obtaining in foro domestico within the different legal systems of the world: it is the principle that 
animates those rules.25 Lord Lloyd-Jones has observed that what matters are the underlying legal 
principles which reflect the requirements of justice.26 General principles are thus not the sum of 
domestic legal rules nor a lowest common denominator.27 The identification of a general principle of 
law, therefore, does not entail the study of one domestic legal system after another: it is sufficient to 
study the various legal families.28 As the International Court observed in Barcelona Traction, the rule 
at issue needs to be "generally accepted by municipal legal systems".29 If it had been necessary to 
show, on the basis of close comparative study of one domestic system after another, that the principle 
was in existence in each of them, then, for example, estoppel could surely never have been considered 
to be a general principle of law, as it plainly (and correctly) has been.30 Against this background, 
  
22  See for example Stephan W Schill (ed) International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2010). 
23  Jules Basdevant Dictionnaire de la terminologie du droit international (Sirey, Paris, 1960) at 475. 
24  Charles De Visscher Théories et réalités en droit international public (4th ed, Pedone, Paris, 1970) at 419. 
25  At 419. 
26  Lord Lloyd-Jones "General Principles of Law in International Law and Common Law" (lecture at the Conseil 
d'État, 16 February 2018) at 3. 
27  Prosper Weil "Le droit international en quête de son identité: cours général de droit international public" 
(1992) 237 Hague Recueil 1 at 145. 
28  Benjamin Samson "PGD: de et pas du" in Hervé Ascencio and others (eds) Dictionnaire des idées reçues en 
droit international (Pedone, Paris, 2017) 433 at 434; and Hugh Thirlway "Concepts, principles and analogies: 
international and municipal legal reasoning" (2002) 294 Hague Recueil 273 at 279. 
29  Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power Co, Ltd (Belgium v Spain) [1970] ICJ Rep 3 at [50]. 
30  See for example Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issued in France (France v Yugoslavia) (1929) PCIJ 
(series A) No 20; Payment in Gold of Brazilian Federal Loans Contracted in France (France v Brazil) (1929) 
PCIJ (series A) No 21; Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Denmark v Norway) (1933) PCIJ (series A/B) No 
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criticism such as the one raised by Roberts, that ascertaining the contours of a general principle of 
law will be impossible if "not all states recognize the doctrine",31 seems misplaced. But, if the 
recognition need not be universal, the principle needs to be recognised on a very wide scale in the 
municipal orders of states.32 
Transcending the technical particularities that are peculiar to each domestic system, general 
principles of law represent the quintessence of the totality of these domestic legal systems beyond 
their diversity.33 Once the domestic rule has been reduced to its core, the principle must be raised to 
the level of international law, so that it can function at the international level.34 In that regard Weil 
has pointed out that:35 
Quant à la réintégration du produit désincarné issu de cette opération d'abstraction-généralisation dans le 
milieu du droit international, elle n'est possible que dans la mesure où les caractéristiques structurelles, 
les nécessites et les objectifs de l'ordre international sont compatibles avec ceux des droits nationaux. 
Only principles of domestic law which are appropriate in the context of international relations, 
which fulfil the exigencies of the international order, are capable of being elevated to the international 
level and of operating there as a source of law.36 In order for domestic law principles to be capable of 
such elevation, they may need to undergo a transformation which gives them an aspect in international 
law which may well be different from what they would have had in the various national legal 
systems.37 That way international law may at one and the same time take inspiration from domestic 
  
53 at [52]–[54], [62] and [69]; Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v Thailand) [1962] ICJ Rep 6 at [31]–[32] 
and [39]–[51]; North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Germany v Denmark and the Netherlands) (Judgment) 
[1969] ICJ Rep 3 at [30]; and Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada v 
United States) [1984] ICJ Rep 246 at [145]. There was, for example, never a substantive principle of estoppel 
in French law and legal systems inspired by it: Philippe Pinsolle "Distinction entre le principe de l'estoppel et 
le principe de bonne foi dans le droit du commerce international" (1998) 125 JDI 905 at 928; Mattias Guyomar 
and Bertrand Sellier Contentieux administratif (Dalloz-Sirey, Paris, 2010) at 273; and Conseil d'État SARL 
Marsadis (1 April 2010). 
31  Anthea Roberts "Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The Dual Role of States" (2010) 
104 AJIL 179 at 214–15. Compare McLachlan, Shore and Weiniger, above n 19, at 315. 
32  Couvreur, above n 13, at 30. 
33  Weil, above n 27, at 145. 
34  At 146. 
35  At 147. 
36  Jules Basdevant "Règles générales du droit de la paix" (1936) 58 Hague Recueil 471 at 501. 
37  Weil, above n 1, at 395. 
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law and safeguard its own independence.38 What results is a body of international law that is 
influenced by domestic law but which remains its own creation.39 
It is inherent in what has just been said that principles which operate in internal law must cohere 
in a general way with the grammar of international law if they are to be able to be successfully 
transposed into general principles of law operating in the international legal system. A defining feature 
(if not the defining feature) of this international legal system remains the absence of a central organ 
with legislative authority.40 This has meant that, even at a time of international legislation through 
multilateral treaties, concepts inspired by the notion of the synallagmatic commitment continue, as 
the International Court observed in Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, to be "of undisputed 
value as a principle".41 Still today international society remains, to a large extent, a society dominated 
by consensualism and the tradition of bilateralism.42 As Crawford has observed: "the character of the 
rights and obligations under different legal systems evidently depends on and is deeply affected by 
the structure and development of that system"; "[a]nd according to a deeply ingrained view of 
international law and international society, the character of international rights and obligations is 
inherently bilateral".43 
But, if the state still remains the prime subject of international law and the essential protagonist 
of international relations, other subjects and other protagonists now coexist with the state, a 
development that shows that international law is opening up vertically.44 Although sovereignty 
  
38  Paul Reuter "L'extension du droit international aux dépens du droit national devant le juge international" in 
Mélanges Waline (Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, Paris, 1974) 241 at 258. 
39  Crawford, above n 10, at 35. 
40  Austro–German Customs Union Case (Advisory Opinion) (1931) PCIJ (series A/B) No 41 at 57 (per Judge 
Anzilotti); and James Crawford "Multilateral Rights and Obligations in International Law" (2006) 319 Hague 
Recueil 335 at 344. 
41  Reservations to the Convention on Genocide (Advisory Opinion) [1951] ICJ Rep 15 at 21 ("une valeur de 
principe indéniable" in the authoritative French text). See also Patrick Daillier, Mathias Forteau and Alain 
Pellet Droit international public (8th ed, Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, Paris, 2009) at 283; 
Eirik Bjorge "'Contractual' and 'Statutory' Treaty Interpretation in Domestic Courts?" in Helmut Philipp Aust 
and Georg Nolte (eds) Interpretation of International Law by Domestic Courts (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2016) 49 at 52; and Frank Berman and Eirik Bjorge "Treaties" in Christopher Greenwood and Dan 
Sarooshi (eds) Oppenheim's International Law (10th ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford) vol 1 
(forthcoming). 
42  Weil, above n 27, at 151; and Vera Gowlland-Debbas "The ICJ and the Challenges of Human Rights Law" 
in Mads Andenas and Eirik Bjorge (eds) A Farewell to Fragmentation: Convergence and Reassertion in 
International Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015) 109 at 144. 
43  Crawford, above n 40, at 345. 
44  Philippe Couvreur "A propos de l'effectivité de la Cour internationale de justice dans le règlement pacifique 
des différends internationaux" (1996) 4 AYIL 103 at 108. 
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remains the touchstone of international law, the role that states have decided to give to sovereignty in 
the post-war period shows that change is afoot. 
One difference can be seen in the fact that, in the 1920s, such international organisations as were 
in existence were largely governed by states, the sovereignty of which was safeguarded by the voting 
rule applicable at that time,45 the requirement of unanimity.46 Today the requirement is an admixture 
of majority and qualified majority,47 majority voting now being the normal requirement for decisions 
within international organisations.48 In a similar vein, the rules governing reservations to treaties used 
to be based on the principle of absolute integrity: a reservation would be valid only if the treaty 
permitted it or all contracting parties agreed to it, failing which the reserving state would not be 
considered a party.49 This has in the post-war period given way to a more flexible system, the 1951 
Advisory Opinion on the Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide being an important milestone.50 And, finally, it is now a common feature of 
international law that states make treaties for the benefit of legal or natural persons; these have been 
referred to as triangular treaties.51 
What this means for the development of general principles of law of a public law character is that 
(as also with general principles of law of a private law character)52 keen attention needs to be given 
to how the principle fits with the "hidden grammar of international legal language" of which it is 
meant to be a part.53 
  
45  See Covenant of the League of Nations 225 CTS 195 (signed 28 June 1919, entered into force 10 January 
1920), art 5(1). 
46  Kolb, above n 12, at 264 and 882. 
47  See Charter of the United Nations, art 18. 
48  Frank Berman and Eirik Bjorge "International Transactions" in Christopher Greenwood and Dan Sarooshi 
(eds) Oppenheim's International Law (10th ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford) vol 1 (forthcoming) at [575].  
49  Crawford, above n 40, at 375. 
50  Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Advisory 
Opinion) [1951] ICJ Rep 15. See Rosalyn Higgins and others Oppenheim's International Law: United Nations 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017) at [22.197]–[22.209]; and Berman and Bjorge, above n 41, at [614]–
[616]. 
51  Anthea Roberts "Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty System" (2013) 
107 AJIL 45 at 93; and Anthea Roberts "Triangular Treaties: The Extent and Limits of Investment Treaty 
Rights" (2015) 56 Harv Intl LJ 353. 
52  See Ben Juratowitch and James Shaerf "Unjust Enrichment as a Primary Rule of International Law" in Mads 
Andenas and others (eds) General Principles and the Coherence of International Law (Brill) (forthcoming). 
53  James Crawford The Creation of States (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006) at 41. 
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III GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC LAW? 
Four points need stressing in relation to the possibility of general principles of a specifically public 
law character. First, the word that international law uses for the works of writers or other persons 
skilled in international law is, in the wording of Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice, "teachings of the most highly qualified publicists".54 The word "publicist" is perhaps more 
readily understood by Francophone audiences than Anglophone ones. According to Littré's 
Dictionnaire de la langue française, the word "publiciste" means "[c]elui qui écrit sur le droit public, 
qui est versé dans cette science". In the Cartesian system of French law, there is a division between 
the "publicistes", those skilled in "droit public", and the "privatistes", who are trained in "droit privé". 
All professors of public international law are in France also (or, in formal terms, first and foremost) 
professors of public law. Thus academic writers specialising in international law are in the 
Francophone tradition by definition public lawyers or, in other words, publicists. Still, in the modern 
period the leading French international lawyers can also be the leading French public lawyers, Prosper 
Weil and Elizabeth Zoller being prominent examples.55 
Second comes the fact that in French public law general principles of law (specifically so-called 
"les principes généraux du droit") have been a prominent source of public law since the 1870s,56 
when the Tribunal des Conflits in Dugave et Bransiet stressed the need to interpret and apply primary 
and secondary legislation "en les conciliant avec les principes généraux du droit".57 Shortly 
thereafter, the concept made an appearance in the literature, in Lafferière's classic Traité de la 
juridiction administrative,58 and thereafter also in the case law of the Conseil d'État,59 where in the 
post-war period it would become one of the foremost sources of French public law.60 In private law, 
meanwhile, there was in French law no comparable concept of general principles of law.61 
  
54  See Franklin Berman "Authority in International Law" (lecture at Humboldt University, Berlin, 25 June 
2018). 
55  See for example Prosper Weil and Dominique Pouyaud Le droit administratif (25th ed, University Press of 
France, Paris, 2017); Prosper Weil, above n 1; Élisabeth Zoller La bonne foi en droit international public 
(Pedone, Paris, 1977); and Élisabeth Zoller Introduction au droit public (2nd ed, Dalloz-Sirey, Paris, 2013).  
56  Bernard Stirn and Yann Aguila Droit public français et européen (2nd ed, Dalloz-Sirey, Paris, 2018). 
57  Dugave et Bransiet Tribunal des Conflits, France, 8 February 1873. 
58  Édouard Lafferière Traité de la juridiction administrative (Berger-Levrault, Paris, 1887) at xiii. 
59  Conseil d'État Cames (21 June 1895) (conclusions: Romieu) ("la solution … nous paraît … découler des 
principes généraux de notre droit"); and Conseil d'État Aramu (26 October 1945) ("principes généraux du 
droit applicable même en l'absence de texte"). 
60  Stirn and Aguila, above n 56, at 239–241. 
61  At 211–212. 
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Third, already in the 1930s the Permanent Court, in Consistency of Certain Danzig Legislative 
Decrees with the Constitution of the Free City, looked to domestic law when it explicated the notion 
of the "Rechtsstaat", or "state governed by the rule of law", as being the "form of government under 
which all organs of the State are bound to keep within the confines of the law",62 equally naturally 
leading the Court to emphasise the importance of fundamental rights. The Court pointed out that 
"Danzig's character as a State governed by the rule of law", or as a Rechtsstaat, was revealed 
particularly in the part of the Free State's Constitution that dealt with the fundamental rights of the 
citizen, adding that:63 
Provisions concerning such rights occur in most of the constitutions drawn up since the beginning of the 
XIXth century. They are designed to fix the position of the individual in the community, and to give him 
the safeguards which are considered necessary for his protection against the State. It is in that sense that 
the words "fundamental rights" (Grundrechte) have always been understood. 
Under the rule of law, continued the Court, the intention is "to safeguard individual liberty from 
any arbitrary encroachment on the part of the authorities of the State".64 The increasing concern of 
international law for the precepts of the rule of law, and the protection it affords against arbitrariness,65 
was also brought out by the International Court when, in Asylum, it warned against "arbitrary action" 
being "substituted for the rule of law".66 Some 40 years later, in ELSI, a Chamber of the International 
Court observed, in relation to whether State action by the Italian executive had breached international 
law by being arbitrary, that "[a]rbitrariness is not so much something opposed to a rule of law, as 
something opposed to the rule of law".67 It is difficult not to see in this elevation of the principle of 
the rule of law onto the international plane a reliance by international law on domestic public law 
principle. 
Fourth, it might be thought to be surprising that such general principles of public law did not take 
on more prominence when Article 38 was drafted in 1920. For two of the leading members of the 
Committee of Jurists were themselves leading publicistes, eminently well-placed to see the utility of 
public law principles in public international law. First, the French member of the Committee, 
Professor Albert de La Pradelle, had from 1912 held a chair at the University of Paris, initially (1912–
  
62  Consistency of Certain Danzig Legislative Decrees with the Constitution of the Free City (1935) PCIJ (series 
A/B) No 65 at 54. 
63  At 54. 
64  At 56. 
65  See Dapo Akande and Eirik Bjorge "The United Kingdom Ministerial Code and International Law: A 
Response to Richard Ekins and Guglielmo Verdirame" (10 December 2015) UK Constitutional Law Blog 
<ukconstitutionallaw.org>.  
66  Asylum Case (Colombia v Peru) [1950] ICJ Rep 266 at 284. 
67  Elettronica Sicula SpA (ELSI) (United States v Italy) [1989] ICJ Rep 15 [ELSI] at 76. 
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1918) of administrative law, publishing in that period a treatise on French constitutional law,68 and 
since 1918 a chair of public international law. Second, Professor Edouard-François-Eugène 
Deschamps, later Baron Deschamps, had in 1871 begun his Belgian university career teaching 
administrative law, and had published several works on domestic administrative and constitutional 
law,69 before he was officially invited, in 1881, to concentrate on public international law.70 
Nevertheless, as is clear from the deliberations of the Committee of Jurists, general principles of 
public law did not take on any prominence whatever in the deliberations of the Committee. But if, in 
the almost entirely consensualist international society of 1920, the most highly qualified publicists of 
the day suppressed the public law character of their legal formation, it is now for the present 
generation to let what Lafferière called the "principes inhérent à notre droit public"71 run their course 
in international law alongside those of private law.  
IV A PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY 
In international law, a text emanating from a state must, in principle, be interpreted as producing 
and as intending to produce effects in accordance with existing international law and not in violation 
of it.72 The intention to derogate from general international law cannot be presumed;73 a derogation 
from the general law cannot be acceded to unless it is clearly spelled out in the treaty at issue.74  
The principle surfaced in rudimentary form in Namibia.75 There it was contended that the 
Covenant of the League of Nations did not confer on the Council of the League the power to terminate 
a mandate for misconduct of the mandatory, and that no such power to terminate a mandate for 
misconduct could therefore be exercised by the United Nations, as it could not derive from the League 
  
68  Albert de La Pradelle Cours de droit constitutionnel (Pedone, Paris, 1912). 
69  See Romain Yakemtchouk "Deschamps (Edouard-François-Eugène)" in Biographie nationale, 41ème tome, 
supplément tome XIII (Bruylant, Brussels, 1979) 198 at 199–200. 
70  At 201. 
71  Lafferière, above n 58, at xiii. 
72  Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v India) [1957] ICJ Rep 142; and Robert Jennings and 
Arthur Watts (eds) Oppenheim's International Law (9th ed, Longman, Essex, 1992) at 1275. 
73  Robert Kolb Interprétation et création du droit international (Bruylant, Brussels, 2006) at 468. 
74  Dette publique ottoman (1925) 1 RIAA 529 at 555 (Sole Arbitrator Borel). See for example South West Africa 
– Voting Procedure (Advisory Opinion) [1955] ICJ Rep 67 at 99 (separate opinion of Judge Lauterpacht); 
Gerald Fitzmaurice "The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1954–9: General Principles 
and Sources of International Law" (1959) 35 BYIL 183 at 227–228; Pellet, above n 1, at 420; and Maurice 
Kamto "La volonté de l'état en droit international" (2004) 310 Hague Recueil 1 at 122–123. 
75  Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Advisory Opinion) [1971] ICJ Rep 16. 
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greater powers than had inured to the League itself.76 The Court observed that, for this objection to 
prevail, it would be necessary to show that the original mandates system:77 
… excluded the application of the general principle of law that a right of termination on account of breach 
must be presumed to exist in respect of all treaties, except as regards provisions relating to the protection 
of the human persons contained in treaties of a humanitarian character.  
The Court added, on the relationship between the treaty and the principle of general international law 
applicable in the case, that:78  
The silence of a treaty as to the existence of such a right cannot be interpreted as implying the exclusion 
of a right which has its source outside of the treaty, in general international law.  
In ELSI a Chamber of the International Court was more explicit.79 The United States had argued that 
the rule of the exhaustion of local remedies did not apply to a case brought under Article XXVI of the 
1948 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation between Italy and the United States.80 The 
Chamber concluded that it found itself:81 
… unable to accept that an important principle of customary international law should be held to have been 
tacitly dispensed with, in the absence of any words making clear an intention to do so. 
International law could in this connection benefit from the more intense and richer experience of 
internal law, where the principle of legality has taken on sharper contours than in international law. 
There is a rule generally accepted by municipal legal systems according to which an affirmative 
statute does not take from the general law, or as it was traditionally expressed by way of Latin brocard: 
statutum affirmativum non derogat communi legi. In French law this question is conceived of as a 
  
76  "The stream cannot rise above its source": James Crawford "Chance, Order, Change" (2013) 365 Hague 
Recueil 9 at 303; and Covenant of the League of Nations, above n 45. 
77  Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia , above n 75, at [96]. 
78  At [96], [47]–[48] and [97]–[98]. See also Amoco International Finance Corporation v Iran (1987–II) 15 
Iran–USCTR 189, (1987) 83 ILR 500 at [112]. 
79  ELSI, above n 67.  
80  Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation between Italy and the United States 79 UNTS 171 (signed 
2 February 1948, entered into force 26 July 1949). Article XXVI states: "Any dispute between the High 
Contracting Parties as to the interpretation or the application of this Treaty, which the High Contracting Parties 
shall not satisfactorily adjust by diplomacy, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice, unless the 
High Contracting Parties shall agree to settlement by some other pacific means." 
81  ELSI, above n 67, at [50]. See further Charles Rousseau "L'Independence de l'État dans l'ordre international" 
(1948) 73 Hague Recueil 171 at 211–212; Denis Alland "L'interprétation du droit international public" (2012) 
362 Hague Recueil 53 at 172; and Roger O'Keefe "Public International Law" (2011) 81 BYIL 339 at 402. 
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matter of the operation of "les principes généraux du droit".82 They are the general law against the 
background of which primary and secondary legislation fall to be interpreted.83 The extent to which 
legal instruments will be interpreted against the background of these general principles, or even be 
disapplied completely, will depend upon the seniority or rank of the instrument to be interpreted 
(regulation, statute or constitutional provision) and the seniority or rank of the general principle 
("valeur réglementaire", "valeur législative" or "valeur constitutionnelle").84 Most general principles 
of law have come to be held to be of constitutional rank. The Conseil d'État in Lamotte relied on the 
right to judicial review ("le droit au recours pour excès de pouvoir contre tout acte administratif") in 
a manner similar to the judicial technique of the principle of legality as exemplified in the common 
law by Ex parte Simms.85 The Conseil d'État followed the Commissaire du gouvernement (a reporting 
judge, not dissimilar to the Advocate General of the Court of Justice of the European Union), who 
had concluded that:86 
The recours pour excès de pouvoir is available, even without legislative warrant, to challenge every 
administrative act, and its effect is to guarantee respect for legality in accordance with the general 
principles of law.  
But the Conseil d'État went further and held that the respect for legality that was demanded by the 
general principles of law was so strong that the right to judicial review would still lie even in the face 
of widely phrased legislation saying there should be no judicial review. The legislation at issue was 
quite clear, providing that the measure in question "ne peut faire l'objet d'aucun recours administratif 
ou judiciaire"; but even this wording was held not to be clear enough to override the general law. 
In post-war Germany the written Basic Law, and the numerous constitutional principles it sets 
out, will to a large extent play the role that the unwritten principles of the common or general law will 
play in United Kingdom and in French law. But even in German law, in the era of the Basic Law, 
certain unwritten principles of law, supra-positive principles of law ("überpositive Rechtgrundsätze") 
as the German Federal Constitutional Court has termed them,87 play a role in the interpretation and 
application of legislation. 
  
82  Bernard Stirn Les sources constitutionnelles du droit administratif (9th ed, Librairie générale de droit et de 
jurisprudence, Paris, 2016) at 22–26. 
83  Stirn and Aguila, above n 56, at 219–220. 
84  At 219–220. 
85  R v Secretary of State for the Home Secretary, Ex parte Simms [2000] 2 AC 115 (HL), on which see below. 
86  Conseil d'État Lamotte (17 February 1950) (conclusions: Devolvé) (translation in: L Neville Brown and John 
S Bell French Administrative Law (5th ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998) at 171). 
87  Südweststaat 1 BVerfGE 14 at 61; 7,5%-Sperrklausel 1 BVerfGE 208 at 233; Gleichberechtigung 3 BVerfGE 
225 at 232; and Ausbürgeung I 23 BVerfGE 98 at 106. 
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According to what in the common law is called the principle of legality, legislation will not be 
held to allow to interfere with a fundamental principle of constitutional law or a fundamental common 
law right unless this has been expressly sanctioned by Parliament.88 The principle is also known as 
the Simms principle, as Lord Hoffmann in that case cast the principle in a particularly attractive 
form:89 
… in the absence of express language or necessary implication to the contrary, the courts … presume that 
even the most general words were intended to be subject to the basic rights of the individual.
  
In reality the principle is no more than the constitutional variant of the age-old rule of English law 
according to which an affirmative statute does not take from the common law (statutum affirmativum 
non derogat communi legi). As Coke put it, "a statute made in the affirmative, without any negative 
expressed or implied, does not take away the common law".90 The principle has been reaffirmed by 
the courts time and again.91 In Rottman Lord Hutton expressed himself in the following terms:92 
It is a well-established principle that a rule of the common law is not extinguished by a statute unless the 
statute makes this clear by express provision or by clear implication.
  
Writing extrajudicially, Laws LJ observed about the principle of legality that "rights protected by 
the common law could not be abrogated by statute save by crystal clear provisions leaving no room 
for doubt as to what the legislative intention was".93 "Crystal clear" is also the formulation relied on 
by the Supreme Court in relation to principles of constitutional law.94 McLachlan has shown that the 
"bedrock principles of legality within the unwritten British constitution" is no different in for  example 
Australia and Canada, despite the fact that those two common law systems have written constitutions; 
it is a matter of what he terms "common law constitutional principles" shared by all the systems of 
  
88  Paul Craig "Constitutional and Non-Constitutional Review" (2001) 54 CLP 147 at 166; and R (on the 
application of Evans) v Attorney General [2015] UKSC 21, [2015] AC 1787 at [56]–[59] (per Lord 
Neuberger). 
89  Ex parte Simms, above n 85, at 131. 
90  Edward Coke Institutes of the Laws of England (17th ed, W Clarke, London, 1817) at 200. 
91  See for example Black-Clawson International Ltd v Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg AG [1975] AC 591 
(HL) at 614 (per Lord Reid); London Borough of Islington v UCKAC [2006] EWCA Civ 340, [2006] 1 WLR 
1303 at [28] (per Dyson LJ); and Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Total Network SL [2008] UKHL 
19, [2008] 1 AC 1174 at [130] (per Lord Mance).  
92  Rottman v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2002] UKHL 20, [2002] 2 AC 692 at [75]. 
93  John Laws "Constitutional Guarantees" (2008) 29 SLR 1 at 8. 
94  R (on the application of Evans) v Attorney General, above n 88, at [56]–[58] and [90] (per Lord Neuberger). 
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the Anglo-Commonwealth.95 What the approaches to the principle of legality in internal law seem to 
share in common is the way in which they protect individual liberty, in addition to the integrity of the 
constitutional order. 
If these rules applied in foro domestico are subjected to the abstraction and generalisation 
necessary for domestic legal rules to be able to operate as general principles of law in international 
law, and we strip them of their domestic particularities,96 they seem capable of becoming a general 
principle of law. They could make up a principle of legality operating at the international level, 
according to which treaties will, in the absence of express or even crystal clear language, be presumed 
to have been intended to be subject to fundamental principles of general international law, including 
principles which protect the rights of the individual, what the Permanent Court already in 1935 termed 
"fundamental rights".97 Arguably the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights relied 
on such a principle when in Al Jedda v United Kingdom, concerning the interpretation of Security 
Council resolutions, it determined that:98  
… in interpreting its resolutions, there must be a presumption that the Security Council does not intend to 
impose any obligation on member State to breach fundamental principles of human rights. In the event of 
any ambiguity in the terms of a United Nations Security Council resolution, the Court must therefore 
choose the interpretation which is most in harmony with the requirements of the Convention and which 
avoids any conflict of obligations. In the light of the United Nations' important role in promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights, it is to be expected that clear and explicit language would be used 
were the Security Council to intend States to take particular measures which would conflict with their 
obligations under international human rights law. 
V A PRINCIPLE REQUIRING POSITIVE LEGAL BASIS FOR 
STATE ACTION 
In 1957 Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice observed that in any legal system the question arises of the 
establishment of what he called a residual or presumptive position. This is what has been referred to 
as the Lotus principle, on the basis of the determination of the Permanent Court's judgment in that 
proceeding.99 Is the subject of the legal system free to do as it pleases, except where the system 
  
95  See Campbell McLachlan "The Allocative Function of Foreign Relations Law" (2012) 82 BYIL 349 at 366; 
and Campbell McLachlan Foreign Relations Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014) at 105–
109. 
96  De Visscher, above n 24, at 419; and Weil, above n 27, at 145. 
97  Consistency of Certain Danzig Legislative Decrees with the Constitution of the Free City (Advisory Opinion) 
(1935) PCIJ (series A/B) No 65 at 54. 
98  Al-Jedda v United Kingdom [2011] ECHR 1092 (Grand Chamber) at [102]. See also Nada v Switzerland 
[2012] ECHR 1691 (Grand Chamber) at [171]. 
99  See on the "Lotus principle" set out in SS 'Lotus' (France v Turkey) (1927) PCIJ (series A) No 10 at 18: Gerald 
Fitzmaurice The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice (Grotius, Cambridge, 1986) at 146–
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prohibits the subject from doing so; or must the subject be able to account for and justify the activity 
by reference to some permissive rule or some other positive justification afforded by the legal 
system?100 In Fitzmaurice's view, three models were possible in international law. The first was that 
the state must be able to point to positive justification for its actions under international law: the state's 
action will be held to be illegal unless it can adduce such positive justification, that is, the action has 
to be done in accord with a permissive rule. This model would imply a presumption of illegality unless 
the contrary could be established. 
The second alternative was that states were free to act as they wished except to the extent that 
international law prevented them from doing so; absent any rule of international law forbidding the 
action, or there being some rule prescribing a particular course of action to which the action does not 
confirm, the action of the state is held to be lawful. This model would involve a presumption of 
legality unless the contrary could be established.101 
Fitzmaurice thought neither of the two models described would suit international law very well, 
suggesting instead a third possibility. This third model was particularly suited to a system such as 
international law, a model that would imply no presumption either way, whether of legality of 
illegality:102 
… a State must at all times act in good faith, in a manner consistent with the spirit of the system, and, on 
this basis, avoid action which is abusive in character, even though technically within the right of the State 
and not positively prohibited by any rule of the system. 
It is difficult to conclude, on the basis of positive international law, that the system of international 
law has elected any particular of these three models. There may be some support for the third model 
in the case law of arbitral tribunals, which have developed what Weil has referred to as the principle 
of self-interpretation or self-appreciation.103 Thus in Lake Lanoux104 the Tribunal observed that:105 
  
147; Crawford, above n 53, at 41–42; Alain Pellet "Lotus: que de sottises on profère en ton nom" in Edwige 
Belliard (ed) Mélanges en l'honneur de Pierre Puissochet (Pedone, Paris, 2008) 215; and Douglas Guilfoyle 
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101  Crawford, above n 53, at 41–42; and Procès-Verbaux, above n 2, at 314 (per Ricci-Busatti).  
102  Fitzmaurice, above n 100, at 50–51. 
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L 109 at 119. 
104  Lake Lanoux (France v Spain) (1957) 24 ILR 101. 
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… it is for each State to evaluate in a reasonable manner and in good faith the situations and the rules 
which will involve it in controversies; its evaluation may be in contradiction with that of another State; in 
that case, should a dispute arise the Parties normally seek to resolve it by negotiation or, alternatively, by 
submitting to the authority of a third party; but one of them is never obliged to suspend the exercise of its 
jurisdiction because of the dispute except when it assumes an obligation to do so; by exercising its 
jurisdiction it takes the risk of seeing its international responsibility called into question, if it is established 
that it did not act within the limits of its rights. 
In a similar vein, the Tribunal in Air Services Agreement of 27 March 1946 determined two 
decades later that:106  
Under the rules of present-day international law, and unless the contrary results from special obligations 
arising under particular treaties, notably from mechanisms created within the framework of international 
organisations, each State establishes for itself its legal situation vis-à-vis other States. 
The rules applied in foro domestico can assist international law in its maturation and sophistication 
in this regard. Over the last 50 years or so a rule generally accepted by municipal legal systems has 
crystallised according to which any state action to be taken must be justified by positive law. As 
regards French law, Weil has observed that modern public law is, above all, "la limitation par le droit 
du gouvernement, de ses services, de ses agents",107 encapsulating the "limitation de l'action 
gouvernementale par le droit".108 As the Conseil d'État's Commissaire du gouvernement Corneille 
held in Baldy already in 1917: "every public law dispute must … begin with the realization that liberty 
[of the individual] is the rule; police restrictions, the exception".109 Similarly, Italian constitutional 
and administrative law adheres to a strict version of the principle of legality,110 spelt out in numerous 
provisions of the Constitution,111 and the principle of legality means here the precept that the state 
can act only when it has legal authority to do so.112 Under German law the principles of public law 
require that the executive always needs authorisation by parliamentary statute if its action encroaches 
  
106  Air Services Agreement of 27 March 1946 (Unites States v France) (1978) 18 RIAA 417 at [81]. 
107  Weil and Pouyaud, above n 55, at 77. 
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on the individual's sphere of rights.113 In a case concerning Article 3(1) of the Basic Law, which 
provides that "[a]ll persons shall be equal before the law", the Federal Constitutional Court in Fraport 
observed that the provision at issue was "based on a fundamental distinction: while the citizen as a 
matter of principle is free, the state as a matter of principle is bound".114  
The position is now no less clear in United Kingdom law.115 As Craig has said of state action 
under the public law of the United Kingdom, for government action to be permissible the government 
must be able to point to some legal basis for the action, and that legal basis needs to be regarded as 
valid by the legal system.116 Craig went on to observe that:117   
If the government cannot provide a legal foundation for its action then the United Kingdom courts would 
regard the action as unlawful, since there would be no lawful authority for it.  
The position was set out in ex parte Fewings by Laws J, who observed that, whilst the rule for private 
persons was that "you may do anything you choose which the law does not prohibit", for public bodies 
the rule is the opposite, as "any action to be taken must be justified by positive law".118 In other words, 
whereas in English law individuals are free to do anything which is not prohibited, government action 
requires legal authority.119 If it was not the case 50 years ago, the rule seems today generally to be 
accepted by municipal legal systems.  
The question is whether these "obvious maxims of jurisprudence of a general and fundamental 
character"120 as they apply in domestic public law are capable of being transported onto the field of 
international law. They seem capable both of the abstraction and the generalisation referred to above; 
they are capable of being stripped of national particularities so that their most general and universal 
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features come to the fore.121 The quintessence of the rule is that, by operation of the rule of law, state 
action needs a positive legal basis. Such a rule seems, again to rely on Basdevant's phrase, "non 
incompatibles avec les exigences de l'ordre international".122  
VI A PRINCIPLE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW WITHIN THE 
STRUCTURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
According to Article 7 of the United Nations Charter, the International Court of Justice is one of 
the United Nations' "principal organs";123 indeed it is, according to Article 92, "the principal judicial 
organ of the United Nations".124 According to itself, in Corfu Channel, the Court is also "the organ" 
of international law, which gives it a particular role in "ensur[ing] respect for international law".125 
But is the International Court competent judicially to review the validity of Security Council 
resolutions? Or is the Leviathan126 of international relations in that sense above the law, in the manner 
that the Prince would be in many legal systems as late as in the 19th century?127  
The Institut de Droit International has observed in this connection that:128 
… in general the rule of law includes a principle according to which all persons, institutions and entities, 
public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to the laws that are publicly promulgated, 
equally enforced and independently adjudicated. 
But the International Court observed in Certain Expenses that, although in the legal systems of 
states there is often some procedure for determining the validity of a legislative or governmental act: 
"no analogous procedure is to be found in the structure of the United Nations".129 This is because, in 
the post-war period, it was felt that if the United Nations Security Council were to avoid meeting with 
the same fate as the Council of the League of Nations then it could not be hamstrung by legal 
mechanisms. When the Charter was negotiated the drafters put a premium on the strength and dispatch 
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of the Security Council, the executive organ of the United Nations. The dangers of abuse of power 
were now, explains Kolb, "to be prevented by political rather than legal means, namely the 
requirement of a qualified majority, and above all the affirmative votes of all five Permanent 
Members".130 
Nevertheless, the International Court would soften its stance somewhat in that same Advisory 
Opinion, by going on actually to scrutinise the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions at 
issue, examining whether the activities they authorised were within the scope of the Charter and 
whether the expenses defrayed were made for the purposes of the United Nations.131 
Furthermore, the International Court observed in Namibia that: "the Court does not possess 
powers of judicial review or appeal in respect of the decisions taken by the United Nations organs 
concerned".132 But, here too, the Court would in the event review the legality of the resolutions at 
issue, concluding that the decisions made by the Security Council "were adopted in conformity with 
the purposes and principles of the Charter and in accordance with its Articles 24 and 25".133 
In Lockerbie Libya instituted proceedings under the Montreal Convention seeking a declaration 
that it had complied with its obligations thereunder in connection with two Libyan nationals charged 
with the Lockerbie bombing.134 After the hearing on provisional measures, but in advance of the 
Court's decision, the Security Council adopted a Chapter VII resolution which determined that Libya's 
failure to demonstrate its renunciation of terrorism and to respond fully and effectively to requests to 
surrender for trial the two Libyan nationals charged with the bombing amounted to a threat to 
international peace, deciding that Libya must comply with those requests.135 The Court decided that 
it was unnecessary to prescribe provisional measures, holding that it was "not at this stage called upon 
to determine definitively the legal effect of Security Council resolution 748 (1992)".136 At the 
preliminary objections stage, the Court did not accede to the objection advanced by the United States 
and the United Kingdom according to which Security Council resolution 748 (1992) superseded 
Libya's rights under the treaty under which it had based its claim, taking the view that it had 
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jurisdiction when the claim was filed and that the subsequent Security Council resolution could not 
affect this.137 There is no indication in the Orders of 1992 that the Court would refuse to examine the 
legality or validity of a resolution adopted by the Security Council, in particular under Chapter VII of 
the Charter.138 Rather the Court indicated that it was not called upon at the provisional measures stage 
to determine the legal effects of resolution 748 in a definitive way and that Libya's purported rights 
were not "appropriate for protection" by the indication of such measures by the Court.139 
No doubt situations where the International Court can judicially review the Security Council will 
arise only incidentally.140 But there are real pressures which push in the direction of accountability.141 
As Crawford has observed:142 
… only when the Court has "clear jurisdiction judicially to review action of all United Nations political 
agencies, including the Security Council … could the rule of law be said to extend to international political 
life. 
Here too internal law can assist the development of international law. In French law there is a 
clear right to judicial review for excess of power of any administrative act.143 The Conseil d'État 
considers it to be a "principe général du droit" that the legality of an administrative act can always be 
reviewed by the administrative courts.144 It follows from decisions such as D'Aillieres and 
Lamotte,145 that this is so even if the administration has been explicitly empowered to act "without 
there being recourse to any court".146 In the celebrated case of Canal the Conseil d'État held, in the 
face of threats of being shut down by General de Gaulle, that it followed from the "principes généraux 
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du droit" that the decision of any public body, including military tribunals set up by a decree signed 
by the head of state, must be subject to review by a court, in the event the Court of Cassation.147  
United Kingdom law is no less exigent. In M v Home Office the Home Secretary was held liable 
for contempt of court, in virtue of his office, not as a private individual,148 Lord Templeman observing 
that:149   
… the argument that there is no power to enforce the law by injunction or contempt proceedings against 
a minister in his official capacity would, if upheld, establish the proposition that the executive obey the 
law as a matter of grace and not as a matter of necessity, a proposition which would reverse the result of 
the Civil War.  
In the majority judgment in the more recent landmark judgment of Evans, the Supreme Court's then-
President, Lord Neuberger, who cited M v Home Office, added that:150   
The proposition that a member of the executive can actually overrule a decision of the judiciary because 
he does not agree with that decision is equally remarkable, even if one allows for the fact that the 
executive's overruling can be judicially reviewed.  
His Lordship went on to observe that in United Kingdom law "[t]he constitutional importance of the 
principle that a decision of the executive should be reviewable by the judiciary"151 is beyond doubt, 
and it has been so for a long time.152 
Ahmed v Her Majesty's Treasury exemplifies the principle in the context of United Nations 
Security Council resolutions.153 The case raised the potential of conflict between the United 
Kingdom's obligations under international law according to the United Nations Charter to follow 
United Nations Security Council resolutions on the one hand and judicial review of what has been 
  
147  Conseil d'État Canal (19 October 1962). See Stirn and Aguila, above n 56, at 219; Brown and Bell, above n 
86, at 57, 217–218 and 237; and Weil and Pouyaud, above n 55, at 78. 
148  Stephen Sedley Lions under the Throne: Essays on the History of English Public Law (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2015) at 221–222. 
149  M v Home Office [1994] 1 AC 377 (HL) at 395. 
150  R (on the application of Evans) v Attorney General, above n 88, at [53] (per Lord Neuberger). 
151  At [54]. 
152  Jackson v Her Majesty's Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56, [2006] 1 AC 262 at [159] (per Lady Hale); In 
reRacal Communications Ltd [1981] AC 374 (HL) at 383 (per Lord Diplock); Anisminic Ltd v Foreign 
Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147 (HL) at 170 (per Lord Reid); and R v Cheltenham 
Commissioners (1841) 1 QB 467 at 474 (per Lord Denman CJ). See also for example Sedley, above n 148, at 
110–111. 
153  Ahmed v Her Majesty's Treasury [2010] UKSC 2, [2010] 2 AC 534. 
 PUBLIC LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 555 
termed "an extra-judicial confiscation scheme"154 on the other.155 The appellants were British citizens 
who had, pursuant to Article 41 of the United Nations Charter, been listed by a United Nations 
Committee set up by the Security Council, and then duly designated under the Terrorism Order and 
the Al-Qaida and Taliban Order in the United Kingdom.156 The United Kingdom gave effect to Article 
41 of the Charter through the United Nations Act 1946.157 The question was what limits, if any, were 
there on the power conferred by s 1 of the United Nations Act on the executive and "whether the 
section confers power on the executive, without any parliamentary scrutiny, to give effect in this 
country to decisions of the Security Council which are targeted against individuals".158 Lord Hope 
held for the Supreme Court that: "If the rule of law is to mean anything, decisions as to what is 
necessary or expedient in this context cannot be left to the uncontrolled judgment of the executive."159  
In German law there is a general principle of judicial review based on the Basic Law and on the 
principle of Rechtsstaat itself. Under German law the system of judicial review is based on Article 
1(3) of the Basic Law, which is cast in the following terms: "The following basic rights shall bind the 
legislature, the executive and the judiciary as directly applicable law." By reason of this rule the courts 
are obliged to enforce such rights against both the executive and the legislature,160 and Article 19(4) 
of the Basic Law translates this general principle of judicial review into a fundamental right that is 
directly enforceable for individuals: "Should any person's rights be violated by public authority, he 
may have recourse to the courts." This system of judicial review is considered in German law to be 
"an emanation of the more general constitutional principle of Rechtsstaat".161 
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It seems eminently possible to extract from these rules, generally accepted by municipal legal 
systems, a quintessence that is capable of being elevated to the international plane. In its broadest 
formulation, that quintessence is that a decision of the executive should be reviewable by the 
judiciary.162 By reason of this general principle of law the International Court would be competent, 
if the question comes before it incidentally, judicially to review the legal effects of Security Council 
resolutions. It may well be that this principle owes something to the notion of inherent powers.163 The 
Court has, as Couvreur has observed:164 
… an inherent (albeit incidental) power to interpret, and possibly examine, the legal effects of the 
decisions of the other principal organs of the United Nations, a power that is necessary for it to fulfil its 
judicial function, whether advisory or contentious. 
VII A PRINCIPLE OF PROTECTION OF LEGITIMATE 
EXPECTATIONS 
When a subject of international law makes assurances to another in a way that leads the other 
legitimately to place trust and confidence in them, then the expectations created are protected by 
international law.165 As de Nanteuil has observed, such a principle of legitimate expectations has been 
in existence for a long time:166  
… des décisions anciennes fondées sur le standard minimum de protection ont déjà accepté d'engager la 
responsabilité de certains Etats en raison d'une méconnaissance des attentes légitimes d'un ressortissant 
étranger, signe que la notion, si elle est apparue récemment dans le droit de l'investissement, n'est 
aucunement inconnue en droit international général. 
In the 1905 award Aboilard the Haitian Government had concluded certain concession contracts 
with a French national who was investing in Haiti. After having acted over a period of time in such a 
way as to give rise to expectations on the part of the investor (by giving him exclusive concessionary 
rights to certain utilities in Port-au-Prince and Pétionville), the Haitian authorities had purported to 
take the view that certain domestic law conditions had not been fulfilled, and the concession was 
revoked. The Tribunal held that, in the circumstances, the revocation amounted to an internationally 
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unlawful act on the part of the Haitian Government. In the view of the Tribunal, which explicitly was 
basing itself on principles of law ("des principes du droit"),167 the Haitian Government had created 
"des attentes légitimes qui, ayant été trompées par le fait du gouvernement lui-même, ont entrainé un 
préjudice dont réparation est du."168  
The source of this principle is to be found in municipal law.169 Although under differing labels, 
the principle of legitimate expectations is generally accepted in municipal legal systems such as 
Islamic law, the common law, and in the civilian tradition. Under Islamic law, faith and reliance are 
protected in ways similar to the principle of legitimate expectations. Mahmassani, an expert of Islamic 
jurisprudence,170 explained in relation to the principle of pacta sunt servanda that a tradition of the 
Prophet reads that: "Muslims are bound by their stipulations".171 This goes beyond only fulfilling 
contracts. The 13th century authority Al Qurtubi observed that a man is bound by what he does "both 
in word and deed"; this "comprises his dealings with his fellow men, his undertakings, and much 
besides, and the injunction that he should keep them and perform them".172 This is no less clear in the 
civil and common law traditions that originated in Europe. As Craig has observed, the concepts of 
legal certainty and legitimate expectations are connected and, although their precise content may vary, 
can be found in the public law of many legal systems.173 In the civil law, exemplified by French law, 
the premium has been on legal certainty, "sécurité juridique", the protection of which has been 
characterised as a general principle of law by the French courts.174 According to Stirn, this principle 
of legal certainty overlaps with aspects of legitimate expectations.175 Thus the Conseil constitutionnel 
has held that citizens are protected against violations of their "legally acquired positions" and changes 
that might "compromise the effects which may legitimately be expected in connection with such 
positions".176 As regards the common law, the doctrine of legitimate expectations has firmly 
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established itself as a fundamental general principle of English law.177 In the common law, the cases 
normally treated as the strongest cases of legitimate expectations are those where there has been an 
individualised representation in which the individual has put faith and reliance.178 According to Craig, 
the reason these cases have been treated as the strongest is that such a representation has been 
considered to carry a particular moral force, and because holding the public body to such a bilateral 
representation would have less far reaching consequences for the administration.179 Another reason 
might be that in those instances the court is able to point to a specific act on the part of the executive 
vis-à-vis the individual which is amenable to review in a manner that does not engage the legislative 
function:180 ''It is each State's undeniable right and privilege to exercise its sovereign legislative 
power.''181 
For the principle of legitimate expectations to be able to operate on the international level, 
however, the principle needs as discussed above to conform to the fundamental exigencies of the 
international order. In spite of the growing similarities between public international law and municipal 
public law, a defining feature of this international legal system remains the absence of a central organ 
with legislative authority.182 Still today international society remains to a certain degree a society 
dominated by consensualism and the tradition of bilateralism.183 As Crawford has observed, 
''according to a deeply ingrained view of international law and international society, the character of 
international rights and obligations is inherently bilateral''.184 In order for the principle of legitimate 
expectations to operate in international law, therefore, it arguably needs to be made to conform to the 
inherently bilateral character of rights and obligations in international law. The protection of legal 
security is in international law a bilateral matter.185 As Kolb has observed, ''[l]a sécurité juridique en 
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droit international est essentiellement une sécurité des rapports bilatéraux ''.186 A legitimate 
expectation therefore cannot in international law be based on general commitments or assurances 
(such as the publication of documents setting out government policy or an invitation to potential 
investors launching a tendering process) which are not directed to any particular recipient. This is 
why international courts and tribunals have been slow to hold that legitimate expectations can exist 
outside of bilateral relationships.187 Thus conceived, the general principle of law protecting legitimate 
expectations is in line with the consensualist and still essentially bilateral nature of international law. 
That might go some way in obviating the misgivings of those who have deprecated the principle of 
legitimate expectations as being ''a general and vague standard''.188 Within carefully defined bounds, 
the principle of protection of legitimate expectations is a general principle of law. As Lauterpacht 
observed more than seventy years ago, it is ''a sound precept of law'', operating to make it impossible 
under international law for a state ''to cause confusion and to disappoint legitimate expectations by 
blowing hot and cold''.189 
VIII CONCLUSION 
No doubt it is true, as Redgwell has observed, that the reliance on general principles of law is 
closely bound up with the appropriate role to be played by international courts and tribunals in the 
interpretation and application of international law.190 The function of the United Nations' principal 
judicial organ is set out clearly in Article 38 of the Court's Statute. The Court should take heart from 
the mandate it has been given in Article 38(1)(c), by deciding in accordance with international law 
such disputes as are submitted to it applying general principles of law in accordance with the needs 
of the progress of the international community. The reality is that general principles of law, in 
common with treaty and custom, enjoy pride of place within Article 38. General principles of law are 
specifically considered more highly ranked than "subsidiary means", the term confined to Article 
38(1)(d).191 Nothing in the wording of Article 38 should therefore discourage reliance by the Court 
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on general principles of law. Furthermore, in today's international legal order, a legal order 
increasingly "influenced by ideas of public law",192 there is nothing in the provision that should lead 
one to conclude that somehow public law principles need tug their forelocks to private law ones. 
Public law principles, far from supplanting private law ones, supplement those emanating from the 
field of private law. In the international law of today, "les exigences à satisfaire",193 to use Quadri's 
words of more than half a century ago, are increasingly of a public nature rather than only private. By 
the same token it would be "erroné de se limiter aux principes du droit privé".194 If one takes account 
of the needs of international law, there is no reason whatever why today we should accede to the 
orthodoxy that the intention behind the concept of general principles is only "to authorize the Court 
to apply the general principles of municipal jurisprudence, in particular of private law, in so far as 
they are applicable to relations of States"195 – if for no other reason than the fact that international 
law no longer governs only relations of states.  
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